The Non-Reality of Free Will.

This monograph offers an argument concerning free will and moral responsibility which identifies hierarchical compatibilism - a view espoused by such philosophers as Neely, Watson, Levin and Dennett - as the most plausible account of free will.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Double, Richard
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: New York : Oxford University Press, 1991.
Subjects:
Online Access: Full text (MFA users only)
ISBN:9780195362336
0195362330
1280525088
9781280525087
0197731112
9780197731116
Local Note:ProQuest Ebook Central
Table of Contents:
  • 1 Introduction; 1. The Problem of the Reality of Free Will; 2. Definitions of Terms; 3. Overview of the Text; 2 A Compatibilist Account of Free Will; 3 Does Freedom Require Morality?; 4 Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility; 5 Free Will as an Exemplar Concept; 6 Meta-Compatibilism; 7 An Argument for Moral Non-Realism; 8 Troubles with Libertarianism; 9 Conclusion; NOTES; REFERENCES; INDEX; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Y; Z.